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Abstract 
Although economists have studied various indicators of resource scarcity (e.g., unit 
cost, resource rent, and market price), the phenomenon of “peaking” has largely been 
ignored due to its connection to non-economic theories of resource exhaustion (the 
Hubbert Curve).  I take a somewhat different view, one that interprets peaking as a 
reflection of fundamental economic determinants of an intertemporal equilibrium.  From 
that perspective, it is reasonable to ask whether the occurrence and timing of the peak 
reveals anything useful regarding the state of resource exhaustion.  Accordingly, I 
examine peaking as an indicator of resource scarcity and compare its performance to 
the traditional economic indicators.  I find the phenomenon of peaking to be an 
ambiguous indicator, at best.  If someone announced that the peak would arrive earlier 
than expected, and you believed them, you would not know whether the news was good 
or bad.  Unfortunately, the traditional economic indicators fare no better.  Their 
movements are driven partially by long-term trends unrelated to changes in scarcity, 
and partially but inconsistently driven by actual changes in scarcity.  Thus, the 
traditional indicators provide a signal that is garbled and unreliable.  
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On The Portents of Peak Oil 
(And Other Indicators of Resource Scarcity) 
 
 
“Portent:  An indication of something important or calamitous about to occur.” 
— thefreedictionary.com 
 
1.  Introduction 
 For better or worse, “peak oil” has gained considerable prominence as an 
indicator of growing resource scarcity.  Since Hubbert (1956) introduced the hypothesis 
that oil production must reach a maximum and then fall into inexorable decline, 
economists have remained skeptical.  That skepticism is largely due to the fact that 
Hubbert’s methods and predictions treat production of oil as an exogenous process 
divorced from market incentives.  Nevertheless, the general public, and numerous 
scientists from disparate fields, remain clearly focused on the prospect of an impending 
and inevitable decline in oil production, and the notion that “peaking” manifests a 
scarcity that necessarily limits future economic growth.  The peak, in other words, is 
undesirable because it ushers in a new age of painful, and potentially catastrophic, 
change.1  Motivated by these sentiments, Campbell and Laherrere (1998) have 
declared that dating oil’s peak is more important even than dating its exhaustion.  
Consistent with this view, we have seen a virtual tournament of among analysts who 
have attempted to date the peak.2 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Leigh (2008), Bardi (2005), and Campbell and Laherrére (1998). 
2 Recent attempts to date the peak include Wood, Long, and Morehouse (2003), Bartlett (2000), Duncan 
and Youngquist (1999), and Korpela (2006). 
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 This paper considers the economic implications of peak oil.  However, we take a 
somewhat broader view of the peaking phenomenon than what is represented by the 
Hubbert Curve.  Any well functioning market economy, endowed with a limited amount 
of an exhaustible resource, will arrange production through time according to prevailing 
economic incentives that reflect market fundamentals such as the size of the resource 
stock, the cost of production, discount rates, the strength of current versus future 
demand, and the availability of substitutes.  In contrast to the Hubbert Curve, where the 
peaking phenomenon is a physical imperative caused by “running out” of the resource, 
the forces that regulate production in a market economy might cause production to fall 
due to insufficient demand, rather than insufficient supply. 
Obviously, it is the interaction of supply and demand that determines the 
equilibrium price path in a market economy, as well as consequent variations in the rate 
of production.  Taking market forces into account does not avoid the inevitable peak, of 
course, but since both sides of the market (demand as well as supply) are integral to the 
rate of production, the peaking phenomenon generated within a market economy 
presumably conveys more information than what is implied by the Hubbert Curve.  With 
this in mind, it seems at least possible that “peak oil” might serve as some kind of useful 
economic indicator of scarcity.  Therefore, despite economists’ justifiable rejection of the 
Hubbert Curve, they may nevertheless reasonably ask whether the phenomenon of 
peaking within a market economy reveals something important about the state of 
resource scarcity—something that would not be revealed by market prices or resource 
rents, for example.   
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 The objective of this paper is therefore to explore whether peaking provides a 
useful economic indicator of scarcity.  The criterion I apply to make that determination is 
very basic and follows Brown and Field (1978), who set forth two criteria by which any 
indicator of resource scarcity might be judged.  The first states quite simply that: 
A minimum condition (for a good index of scarcity) is that the 
index go up when underlying determinants shift to increase 
actual or expected demand for the resource relative to actual 
or expected supply. 
 
The second criterion goes quite a bit further: 
It would be much more useful, furthermore, if it were 
possible to distinguish the contribution to the changes in the 
index made by each important determinant of demand and 
supply shifts. 
 
The second criterion is notable because it requires the indicator to signal not just 
that a change has occurred, but also the source of the change.  Although this may be a 
desirable characteristic of an ideal indicator, in practice it seems beyond reach, as I 
argue later.  Thus, I will focus on Brown and Field’s first criterion, which refers to an 
exercise in comparative statics and expresses the idea that an indicator of scarcity 
should provide reliable directional signals of unexpected changes to the balance of 
supply and demand.3   
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, I contrast the two 
explanations of peaking behavior:  first the approach built upon the Hubbert Curve, 
followed by a simple formulation of Hotelling’s equilibrium production path.  The 
usefulness of peaking as an indicator of scarcity is examined in Section 3.  In Section 4 
I assess the usefulness of the traditional economic indicators of scarcity, and discuss a 
                                                 
3 Some might prefer the term “comparative dynamics” as used by Oniki (1973) to describe analysis of the 
impact of parametric changes on the entire equilibrium path. 
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popular misconception that stems from the previous literature on the subject and offer a 
new interpretation of that literature.  The findings of the study are summarized in the 
concluding Section 5.   
2.  Peak Oil:  Hubbert vs. Hotelling 
A peak rate of production figures prominently in all models of resource extraction.  
However, the reason for the peak, and its timing, vary according to the nature of the 
model.  I illustrate this below, where Hotelling’s peak is defined and clearly distinguished 
from Hubbert’s peak. 
Hubbert’s Peak 
The Hubbert Curve is built upon the assumption that production is distributed 
continuously through time according to a bell-shaped curve, which we denote by the 
function qt = URR×f(t), where qt represents the production rate at time t, URR 
represents the volume of ultimate recoverable reserves (assumed to be fixed and 
known), and where f(·) represents a normal probability distribution with mean T and 
standard deviation —which are parameters to be estimated.4  In addition to the 
presumed value of URR, the data which support estimation consist (minimally) of the 
production rate at t1 (q1) and cumulative production to t1 (denoted  Q1).  Hubbert’s 
original sketch, which projects the eventual decline of global oil production, is shown in 
the upper panel of Figure 1.  The lower panel is a generalized sketch that ties our 
terminology to Hubbert’s construct. 
                                                 
4 This is a stylized formulation of the Hubbert Curve for illustrative purposes only.  Most practitioners refer 
to f(·) as a time-series function rather than a probability distribution, but analytically they are the same.  
Many variations are possible and many have been employed.  Hubbert (1967) actually applied the logistic 
distribution and many researchers have followed that lead.  The assumption of symmetry is sometimes 
relaxed.  The domain of the distribution can be specified in terms of number wells drilled, rather than time, 
as in Reynolds (2002), but unlike the Hubbert Curve, that approach produces something roughly akin to a 
production function, not a production forecast. 
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Because the maintained assumptions are quite strong, and although the given 
information (q1, Q1, and URR) is sparse, it is then possible to determine T and thus 
predict the onset of peak production.  To demonstrate the procedure, we note first that 
the integral of qt over the entire domain is identically equal to URR, and that peak 
production occurs at time T, the mode of f(·).  We also note that Q1/URR measures the 
proportion of the resource that has already been depleted, which according to the 
standardized normal distribution implies: 
Pr ቀݖ ൑ ௧భି்ఙ ቁ ൌ
ொభ
௎ோோ, 
Or equivalently: 
௧భି்
ఙ ൌ ݖఈ, (1) 
where α = Q1/URR, and zα marks the lower tail of the standard normal distribution. 
We also know that current production relative to ultimate recovery (this ratio is denoted 
β) gives the height of f(·) at t1.  Thus: 
௤భ
௎ோோ ൌ ߚ ൌ ݂ሺݐଵሻ ൌ
ଵ
√ଶగఙ ݁
ିቀ೟భష೅഑ ቁ
మ
. (2) 
After substituting for  in (2) using  = (t1-T)/zα from (1), the implied value of T is 
obtained: 
ܶ ൌ ݐଵ െ ௭ഀఉ ൈ
ଵ
√ଶగ ݁ି௭ഀ
మ. (3) 
The predicted date of peak oil (T) will be highly sensitive to the presumed value 
of ultimately recoverable reserves (through the impact of URR on both zα and β).  This 
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is problematic for economists since the volume (and timing) of ultimate recovery 
presumably depends upon price—which in turn depends upon demand, interest rates, 
and the cost of production—none of which are incorporated here.5  There is no 
assurance in Hubbert’s model that the projected rates of future production will actually 
clear the market.  Although the prediction is simple, it is not credible due to neglect of 
these fundamental economic factors.  Empirical tests of this procedure performed by 
Brandt (2007) and Nehring (2006), encompassing numerous global petroleum basins, 
failed badly in predicting the peak, which reinforces economists’ theoretical objections to 
the underlying method.6 
 It is possible to proceed along similar lines without presuming to know the 
volume of ultimately recoverable oil, at least if there are sequential observations 
available on production.  For example, suppose that q1 and q2 represent the historical 
rates of production observed at two distinct dates, and let Q1 and Q2 represent the 
cumulative production volumes associated with those dates.  The problem of calculating 
T is then reduced to identifying the unique normal distribution that conforms to these 
two points on the density function.  As in the previous case, there are two equations and 
two unknowns, which gives a unique solution for T and .  Once those values are 
                                                 
5 Proponents of the Hubbert Curve have an entirely different perspective on this point.  Aleklett and 
Campbell (2003), for example, refer to depletion models that include things like investment, demand and 
supply, and other economic factors as the “flat-earth approach,” and claim that “the malign influence of 
doctrinaire economics” acts as an obstacle that stands in the way of efforts to date the peak.  
6 The Hubbert Curve might have been forgotten altogether but for the fact that Hubbert’s 1956 prediction 
that U.S. oil production would peak around 1970 was famously borne out.  It should also be noted (but 
usually is not) that the predicted volume of oil to be produced at the peak was 37% too low, and that 
Hubbert’s predictions regarding coal and natural gas ran badly amiss.  Hubbert predicted that U.S. oil 
production would peak at 3 billion barrels per year; actual production in 1970 was 4.1 billion barrels.  
Hubbert predicted that U.S. gas production would peak at 14 trillion cubic feet per year in 1973; actual 
production was 21 trillion cubic feet in 2009.  Hubbert predicted that global coal production will peak in 
2150 at about 6.4 billion metric tonnes; actual production reached that level in 2007 and is still growing 
rapidly.  (Actual production data are from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010 edition). 
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obtained, one solves for the volume of ultimately recoverable reserves by integrating the 
distribution.  It is important to realize, however, that although URR is not assumed to be 
directly observable here, none of the structural assumptions of the model have been 
relaxed:  ultimate recovery is still determined independently of the relevant economic 
variables.   
In most applications of the Hubbert Curve, a time-series of many production data 
points is available, which means the two-parameter model is over-identified.  Thus, 
some type of estimation criteria must be specified to identify the parameter values that 
minimize the fitted errors.  Empirical attempts to apply the model in this fashion have 
revealed the poor quality of estimates (and predictions) that result.  For example, Harris 
(1977) demonstrated that a simple OLS regression fit to Hubbert’s data produces an 
estimate of URR that falls short even of the volume of already known discoveries—
which implies that the volume of future discoveries must be negative.  Cavallo (2004) 
reexamined Hubbert’s data and found that the historical production curve does not 
reliably distinguish between alternative values of URR; the regression R-squared of 
Hubbert Curves with URR ranging between 150 and 600 billion barrels varies only in the 
third decimal point.  Cleveland and Kaufmann (1991) also document the difficulty of 
estimating URR based on the goodness-of-fit of historical data to the Hubbert Curve. 
Hotelling’s Peak 
Hotelling (1931) pioneered the economic study of peak oil, although his work 
(and most of the related models that have ensued) are usually not described in those 
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terms.7  Because the Hotelling model is well known to many economists, only a cursory 
review of the simplest possible application is provided here.8  More elaborate and 
realistic versions of the Hotelling model have been developed, and, as Gordon (2009) 
emphasizes, those extensions undoubtedly provide better empirical predictions of real-
world production and price trends.  However, our goal is not to predict the future, but to 
determine conceptually whether the peaking phenomenon provides a consistent 
indicator of scarcity.  As we will show, peak oil fails this simple test even in models 
where the economy is deliberately oversimplified and the depletion phenomenon is 
entirely straightforward.  Adding further complexity (realism) to the model would only 
increase the degree of ambiguity that surrounds the peaking phenomenon. 
Let there be a fixed volume of the depletable resource (R) available at time t0.  
The unit cost of production (C) is constant through time, which implies no variations in 
resource grade and no technological change.  The relevant discount rate (r) also 
remains constant through time.  Demand for the resource is given by a constant 
elasticity demand function and the quantity demanded at any given price is assumed to 
grow exogenously at the rate g—which may represent the combined force of population 
growth, economic development, etc.9  Thus, the demand function can be written as: 
                                                 
7 Holland (2008) is one of the very few authors who have explored the timing of peak oil within the 
Hotelling framework.  Greene, Hopson, and Li (2006) also investigate peaking behavior in the context of 
an economic transition from conventional to unconventional resources.  Although Farzin (1995) does not 
specifically focus on the production peak, he does explore the relationship between a declining (or 
increasing) production trend and other measures of resource scarcity.  Without embracing Hotelling’s full 
equilibrium framework, various authors have shown via ad hoc specifications that economic variables 
improve the fit of the Hubbert Curve to historical data; see for example Bopp (1980), Kaufmann (1991), 
Cleveland an Kaufmann (1991), and Kaufmann and Cleveland (2001).  
8 Readers who are interested in the many extensions to the basic model are referred to Hotelling (1931), 
Herfindahl (1967), Solow (1974), Levhari and Liviatan (1977), Devarajan and Fisher (1981), Krautkraemer 
(1998), Farzin (1992), etc. 
9 I have also investigated models with linear demand and can say that the results reported here are 
robust to the form of the demand function. 
10 
 
ܳ௧ௗሺ ௧ܲሻ ൌ ܭ ൈ ௧ܲఌ ൈ ݁௚௧ 
Moreover, a perfect substitute for the depletable resource (i.e., a backstop 
technology) is available in unlimited quantities at constant unit cost (B).  The cost of the 
backstop is assumed to be known but may be relatively high.   
Under these conditions, and assuming that markets are competitive and that a 
full set of futures markets exists, a unique inter-temporal equilibrium exists and is 
characterized by the price path that satisfies the following three conditions: 
(i) ௧ܲ െ ܥ ൌ ሺ ଴ܲ െ ܥሻ݁௥௧  ׊ ݐ א ሺݐ଴, ܶሻ   [no inter-temporal arbitrage] 
(ii) ்ܲ ൌ ܤ                                             [transition to backstop at time T] 
(iii) ׬ ܳ௧ௗሺ ௧ܲሻ݀ݐ்௧బ ൌ ܴ                              [resource exhaustion at time T] 
Because production of the resource is positive only during the finite interval [t0,T], 
it follows that a peak rate of production must exist.  Although a closed-form solution 
does not exist for the date of the peak, it can easily be computed once specific 
functional forms and parameter values are specified.  The timing of the peak will 
generally depend upon the fundamental economic factors that describe the economy.  
The peak may come at mid-course (as predicted by Hubbert), or early, or late in the 
course of exploitation—all depending upon the elasticity of demand, the economic 
growth rate, the discount rate, the initial volume of resource available, and the cost of 
producing the depletable resource relative to that of the backstop technology.10  Indeed, 
                                                 
10 Gordon (1967) and Levhari and Liviatan (1977) were among the first to characterize the influence of 
various economic factors on the shape of the equilibrium path. 
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in more elaborate models that incorporate exploration, technological change, etc., the 
rate of production may peak more than once along the equilibrium path. 
3.  Peaking as an Indicator of Scarcity 
I illustrate the relationship of the Hotelling peak to underlying economic 
fundamentals using a series of examples.  In each case, the long-term elasticity of 
demand is assumed to be -0.35.  The discount rate is 10%, and the initial volume of the 
resource is assumed to be 4,000 units.  The unit cost of production is $20 for the 
resource versus $100 for the backstop technology.  In what I will refer to as the 
Benchmark scenario, the growth rate of demand is taken as 1.5% per annum, and the 
demand function (intercept) is calibrated such that, if the resource were priced at the 
cost of production (i.e., $20), demand would exhaust all available supply in roughly 23 
years.  The case is hypothetical, of course, and the unit of physical measurement is 
arbitrary, but the general outline perhaps paints a picture of the world oil market that is 
not implausible.  All costs, growth rates, and reserve-to-production ratios are certainly 
within the realm of historical experience. 
This particular set of assumptions leads to the equilibrium price and production 
paths shown in Figure 2.11  The price starts at $26.61 (30% above cost, which 
represents the scarcity rent or “user cost” of the resource at that time).  Over the course 
of 26 years and 3 months, the price (red line) rises to $100, which is the cost of the 
backstop, and given the strength of demand at these prices, the total resource 
endowment is produced and exhausted just as the backstop technology becomes 
economic.  Beyond that point, the price no longer increases due to the unlimited supply 
                                                 
11 The trajectories of price and production shown in the figure were computed in Excel using a discrete-
time approximation to equations (i) – (iii), where each time-step represents one month.   
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of the backstop technology.  Production, on the other hand, first rises then falls.  Peak 
production occurs after 36% of the original resource has been depleted—roughly one-
third of the way into the period of exploitation.  If we were to rely on the peak to signal 
impending exhaustion, it seems that substantial warning is supplied; it certainly provides 
more than a last-minute indication.  In that respect, this particular economic scenario of 
depletion is not much different than the standard Hubbert result, where the peak comes 
around the half-way mark. 
It should not be surprising to find that different results can be obtained by varying 
the underlying economic parameters.12  Indeed, it is perhaps heartening (at least on first 
examination) to find that very slight changes in the underlying economic factors tend to 
cause rather dramatic changes in peaking behavior—for if the peaking phenomenon did 
not register changes in the underlying economic factors, it could hardly serve as an 
indicator of the degree of scarcity.  This is illustrated by the next two scenarios (High-
Growth and Low-Growth) which deviate from the Benchmark case only in terms of the 
assumed economic growth rate.  In the High-Growth case (Figure 3), the rate of growth 
is increased from 1.5% to 2.75%—a small change well within the range of historical 
experience.  The resulting impact on price is also relatively small, it now starts at $28.50 
instead of $26.61, but the impact on peaking behavior is dramatic: the peak is now 
delayed to the very end of the exploitation period when none of the resource remains.  
The High Growth outcome contrasts even more sharply with the Low Growth case 
(Figure 4).  When the growth rate is reduced to 0.5% (also within the realm of historical 
experience), the peak occurs at the very outset of exploitation, when 100% of the 
                                                 
12 Gordon (1981) showed, for example, that the shape of the equilibrium path will depend on whether 
demand is stationary, rising, or falling over time. 
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resource remains.13  From that point on, production is all downhill.  The results of these 
various scenarios are summarized in Table 1. 
Does the earlier peak of the Low-Growth case signify greater scarcity?  Certainly 
not in a purely physical sense because the same resource endowment is common to all 
three scenarios.  Indeed, since demand is always smaller (holding prices constant) in 
the Low-Growth case, it would be reasonable to claim the resource is in fact less 
scarce.  The apparent implication is that peaking provides an inverse indicator of 
resource scarcity:  the more economically abundant is the resource, the earlier will the 
peak arrive.  Unfortunately, however, the behavior of the peak is not so simple or 
consistent, as further analysis reveals.   
Consider, as an alternative to the Low Growth scenario, the impact of a uniform 
and permanent 25% reduction in demand, as might occur if consumers were suddenly 
to adopt a more conservation-oriented lifestyle.14  Just as in the Low-Growth case, this 
Lifestyle scenario takes pressure off the finite resource base relative to the Benchmark 
case and reduces the degree of scarcity.  The impact on peaking behavior, however, is 
in the opposite direction (Figure 5).  Here the reduction in scarcity causes the peak to 
be delayed, arriving not until 48% of the resource has been depleted, as opposed to 
36% in the Benchmark case (and 0% in the Low Growth case).  Thus, a demand 
reduction may either advance or retard the peak—depending on the particular 
circumstances of the reduction.  Apparently, the timing of the peak is an inconsistent 
indicator of changes in the underlying degree of resource scarcity. 
                                                 
13 In Hotelling’s original specification, with stationary demand and constant cost, the peak always occurs 
before any depletion has occurred.  Levhari and Liviatan (1977) and Gordon (1981) demonstrate how 
relaxing those assumptions gives rise to varied production trends. 
14 This is effected, holding all else constant, by a 25% reduction in K, the intercept of the demand 
function.   
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The next case to consider is the impact of diminished expectations regarding the 
remaining physical endowment of the resource.  If, for example, the initial volume of 
resource were reduced by 25% (falling from 4,000 to 3,000) units, that certainly 
represents an increase in scarcity.  Under this Resource Disappointment scenario 
(Figure 6), in which all other parameters are held constant at Benchmark values, the 
peak arrives substantially earlier, after only 21% of the (diminished) volume of resource 
has been consumed.  But, this comparative static reaction conflicts with the Low Growth 
case considered previously:  “slower growth = less scarcity = earlier peak” vs. “less 
resource = more scarcity = earlier peak.”  The difference cannot be ascribed to market 
myopia or mistaken expectations since all of these scenarios reflect rational equilibrium 
behavior predicated upon perfect information and a well functioning set of futures 
markets.   
Before leaving the Resource Disappointment case, it may be worth noting that 
the immediate price impact of what is a fairly spectacular downward revision to the 
resource endowment is muted:  although the resource stock was reduced by 25%, the 
price of the resource rises initially by only 15% (relative to the Benchmark case) and 
production declines by only 5%.  Part of the reason for the muted response, of course, 
is that it is more economical (due to the impact of discounting) to postpone much of the 
adjustment in consumption to the future.  This does not represent myopia, but the 
efficient functioning of a market economy that weighs future benefits against present 
costs.  The potential relevance to the oil market in the real world is the idea that a 
sudden perception, say, that some portion of Saudi oil reserves are “illusory” is not so 
15 
 
likely to trigger a sensational increase in the market price of oil, contrary to what some 
observers have suggested as a cause of the 2008 oil price spike.15   
Further Ambiguity 
Based on the results thus far, we have an impression that the timing of the peak 
does not reliably distinguish between greater or lesser scarcity.  This conclusion is 
reinforced if we consider how cost changes affect peaking behavior.  Imagine, for 
example, that due to a one-time technological breakthrough the cost of producing the 
resource could be reduced to $15 (from $20 in the Benchmark case), which by most 
definitions would reduce the economic scarcity of the resource.  The impact of this 
breakthrough on the market equilibrium (Figure 7) would be to reduce the initial price to 
$22.42 (from $26.61).  Notice that the entire cost reduction is not passed through since 
the market price incorporates the resource rent as well as the cost of production—and 
resource rent rises due to the increased cost advantage relative to the backstop 
technology.  However, the peak production now arrives after only 21% of the resource 
has been consumed—much earlier than in the Benchmark Case where the peak arrived 
after 36% had been consumed.  Thus, this result seems to conform to the “decreased 
scarcity=earlier peak” pattern that we encountered before.  However, if technological 
progress is continuous, rather than one-shot, the pattern is again reversed.  Let there 
be, in place of the one-shot cost reduction, an exogenous 3% annual reduction in the 
cost of producing the resource, with all else as in the Benchmark case (Figure 8).  Like 
the previous cost-saving example, by most accounts this would signify decreased 
economic scarcity.  However, the impact of this type of technological progress is not to 
                                                 
15 Here I am referring to the adjustment of price to its new long-run equilibrium path.  The short-run 
reaction, although not persistent, would be more pronounced due to the lower short-run elasticities of 
both demand and supply. 
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advance, but to delay the peak, which now occurs only after 40% of the resource has 
been produced (as opposed to 36% in the Benchmark scenario and 21% in the 
Technological Breakthrough scenario).  It may be that increased scarcity is indicated by 
a later peak, but sometimes it is just the reverse. 
4.  Traditional Indicators of Scarcity 
I have demonstrated that peak oil fails Brown and Field’s minimum condition for a 
useful indicator:  it does not always “go up” or “down” in a consistent manner.  Do the 
traditional economic indicators of resource scarcity (i.e., unit cost, resource rent, and 
market price) fare better?  Despite the rather extensive literature that has pursued this 
question, the answer is not altogether clear.  Whereas previous studies have been 
widely interpreted as demonstrating the failure of the traditional indicators, I argue that 
the basis for that conclusion is open to question and requires clarification and 
reinterpretation. 
A Reinterpretation of the Literature 
To be sure, there have been many investigations of the dynamic behavior of the 
traditional indicators.  But that literature follows a different tack:  one where the 
comparative static impact of changes in scarcity have not been the subject of inquiry.  
What has been investigated is a very different issue:  how the traditional indicators 
progress as the economy moves along a given equilibrium depletion path.16  A rising 
equilibrium price trajectory can easily be rationalized, but so can a U-shaped curve, as 
in Slade (1982).  Moreover, given the range of plausible variation in the structural 
                                                 
16 Analyses of this type are numerous and include Fisher (1979), Slade (1982), Devarajan and Fisher 
(1982), Halvorsen and Smith (1984), Livernois and Uhler (1987), Norgaard (1990), Reynolds (1999), 
Cleveland and Stern (1999), and Farzin (1995), to name but a few.   
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factors that enter into these models (e.g., technical change and exploration), almost any 
pattern or trend involving price, cost, and resource rent might be encountered as a 
given economy progresses along its equilibrium depletion path.17   
These studies give a correct picture of how a given equilibrium unfolds through 
time, but they have been misinterpreted, in my opinion, as also addressing the impact of 
comparative static changes in scarcity.  Thus, Fisher (1979) finds that “cost and rent are 
sometimes well behaved indicators of scarcity, sometimes not. …  Where cost moves in 
the right direction [as the economy progresses along the equilibrium depletion path], 
rent does not, and vice versa.”18  Likewise, Farzin (1995) notes that the search for an 
appropriate indicator of scarcity is complicated by the fact that, in numerous cases, the 
three traditional indicators will not move in concert along the equilibrium path.  
Halvorsen and Smith (1984) observe that “increasing physical scarcity may be 
associated with either increases or decreases over time [along the equilibrium path] in 
any or all of the proposed measures.”  And Cleveland and Stern (1999) opine that along 
a U-shaped equilibrium price path, the market price might provide a false signal of 
reduced scarcity. 
I argue that the reported failure of these indicators is somewhat peremptory 
because the question of what is to be signaled has not yet been properly framed.  What 
is the policy relevance or prescriptive importance of changes in scarcity indicators that 
are observed as the economy progresses along a given equilibrium path?  We cannot 
say these changes indicate unexpected shifts in the underlying fundamentals, or that 
they mark a departure from the existing equilibrium.  They are not the result of a 
                                                 
17 For example, see Halvorsen and Smith (1984), Farzin (1992), and Krautkraemer (1998). 
18 I have inserted the italicized phrase to clarify the context.   
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comparative static shock to the economy.  Rather, the evolving measures of scarcity are 
the predetermined result of society’s choice of an optimal depletion path (assuming that 
markets function well and without externalities, which is typical of this literature).  Within 
that framework, the degree of resource scarcity observed at each point along the 
equilibrium path is exactly the level that is required to maximize social welfare.  So what 
if an indicator is interpreted to mean that scarcity has increased from yesterday to 
today?  Society chose that path of exploitation (and increasing scarcity) and any 
deviation would only impose unnecessary costs on the economy.  In other words, it 
would not make sense to interpret the trend of increasing resource scarcity that is 
experienced along a given equilibrium path as an indication that we have become 
poorer, or as an invitation for the government or some other intervener to take actions 
designed to slow the rate of depletion or otherwise alter the course of events. 
In this respect, the discussion of scarcity indicators may benefit from a closer 
connection to the literature on economic sustainability.  A sustainable path, as 
described by Solow (1992), is one that allows every future generation the option of 
being as well off as its predecessors.  Our duty to future generations is not to bequeath 
any particular thing (like a specific mineral deposit), but to preserve a generalized 
capacity to produce economic well-being, which requires replacing used-up resources 
with other forms of produced capital.19  As we move along any equilibrium depletion 
path, making such investments as we go, this generalized level of welfare does not 
change from year to year, or generation to generation.  The level of welfare would be 
affected, however, if there were an unexpected change in resource stocks, technology, 
                                                 
19 To sustain the present level of consumption requires net investment in produced capital equal to the sum of 
resource rents from that portion of the finite resource that is extracted each period.  See Hartwick (1977).  
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or demand; that is to say, if there were a comparative static change in the economic 
fundamentals. 
I understand this to mean that not all changes in scarcity indicators are created 
equal.  Changes caused by unexpected shocks (comparative static effects) must be 
interpreted differently than changes that simply record the economy’s continued 
progress along a given equilibrium path, as indicated by Figure 9.  The upper panel 
demonstrates the comparative static shift to a new equilibrium path (with higher prices 
and lower welfare) due to the unexpected loss of resource endowment.  The lower 
panel demonstrates the movement to higher prices along one equilibrium path (with no 
effect on welfare) that accompanies scheduled production.  This poses the practical 
problem of how the two types of change can be separated or distinguished, and that is 
where the equilibrium models have an important role to play.  If it is established, for 
example, that resource rent will grow in equilibrium at the rate of interest, then 
comparative static changes in the underlying fundamentals would be indicated by any 
deviation from that trend.  It is not the change in the scarcity indicator that signals a 
favorable or unfavorable development, it is a deviation from the expected change that 
matters. 
Apparently, such deviations are frequent based on the lack of success reported 
in fitting historical time-series data to the Hotelling model.20  These failures should not 
necessarily be interpreted as rejections of the Hotelling framework, although they are 
often characterized that way.  As Swierzbinski and Mendelsohn (1989) and 
Krautkraemer (1998) point out, the flow of information constantly generates 
                                                 
20 For example, see Barnett and Morse (1963), Smith (1979), Slade (1982), Heal and Barrow (1980), 
Smith (1981), Farrow (1985), and Halvorsen and Smith (1986).   
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unanticipated changes in expectations regarding relative scarcity of the resource, which 
means that the historical time series data should not be expected to conform to an 
equilibrium path, even though expected future prices may do so.  
What follows from this discussion is that the usefulness of a given indicator of 
resource scarcity is determined by its ability to accurately signal comparative static 
shifts, not by its evolution along an equilibrium path.  In other words, I am not bothered 
that Farzin (1992) has found conditions under which resource rent may fall as the 
economy progresses along a given equilibrium depletion path, as long as that same 
indicator would rise if some portion of the remaining stock were unexpectedly removed.  
This distinction takes us back, of course, to Brown and Field’s first criteria, which is 
focused on an indicator’s ability to consistently signal comparative static changes in the 
underlying fundamentals. 
Unfortunately, it is not so easy in practice to recognize the shocks to long run 
equilibrium trajectories as they occur, or to separate the comparative static movements 
from the evolutionary trend.  What the previous literature has established is that the 
traditional indicators of scarcity are partially driven by long-term trends that are 
unrelated to scarcity.  Thus, movements that truly signal unexpected changes in scarcity 
(i.e., movements away from the trend) may be difficult to isolate and identify.   
Comparative Static Behavior of the Traditional Indicators 
Even if it were possible, with sufficient research, to isolate comparative static 
movements in the traditional indicators from their evolutionary trend, those movements 
would not, unfortunately, provide consistent or reliable signals of underlying changes in 
scarcity.  This point is new to the literature and requires further elaboration. 
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The comparative static properties of the traditional indicators are simpler in some 
respects than the previous literature might suggest.  Unit cost, for example, is a direct 
measure of the inputs required to produce the resource, and any increase in unit cost 
implies that, holding output in the rest of the economy constant, there is a reduced 
capacity to produce the resource in question.  Or, if the level of resource production is to 
be maintained, then production of something else somewhere else must sacrificed.  
Thus, unexpected changes in unit cost provide unambiguous signals of changes in the 
underlying degree of scarcity.  However, as Krautkraemer (1998) and others have 
observed, unit cost is driven by technology, not forward looking, and therefore cannot 
be counted on to signal changes in relative scarcity that are triggered by shifts in 
demand.   
Resource rent, the second traditional indicator of scarcity (and one that is 
preferred by a number of resource economists), unfortunately provides comparative 
static signals that are not well behaved.21  On the one hand, resource rent represents 
the shadow price of the resource constraint and (holding all else constant) varies 
directly with the degree of physical scarcity.22  Thus, unexpected variations in the 
resource stock will be reflected by contemporaneous changes in resource rent:  greater 
scarcity creates higher rent.  On the other hand, other factors (like technical change and 
the strength of demand) also impact the shadow price of the resource and in certain 
cases will exert a countervailing influence that garbles the signal and creates ambiguity. 
For example, recall the Continuous Innovation scenario from Section 3, where 
the Benchmark equilibrium was perturbed by introducing an exogenous 3% annual 
                                                 
21 See for, example, the discussion in Devarajan and Fisher (1982). 
22 Fisher (1979) expresses a presumption that this result would hold even if there were not a complete set 
of futures markets for the resource in question. 
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reduction in unit cost (less scarcity).  The immediate impact is to increase resource rent 
since cheaper extraction makes each unit of the resource more valuable relative to the 
backstop technology (see Table 1).  We have an ambiguity because, in this case, it is a 
reduction in scarcity that triggers higher rents.  (Recall that an increase in physical 
scarcity had a similar impact—see previous paragraph).  Thus, diagnosing underlying 
changes in scarcity on the basis of comparative static changes in resource rent 
obviously requires additional, more specific information about the fundamentals.  
The third indicator of scarcity, market price, is just the sum of the other two 
indicators.  It therefore inherits whatever ambiguity they possess.  If a factor that 
increases scarcity (Resource Disappointment) will trigger an increase in resource rent, 
then so will it increase the price.  If another factor that decreases scarcity (Continuous 
Innovation) will also trigger an increase in resource rent, then so will it also increase the 
price.  So, what are the implications of a comparative static increase in the price of the 
resource?  Without more specific fundamental information, it is impossible to say.   
Brown and Field’s Second Criterion 
Brown and Field’s desire for an indicator that would signal not just a change in 
scarcity, but also the source of that change, is demanding and on close inspection 
probably unattainable.  The reason for this is not specific to exhaustible resources; it 
applies also in the realm of renewable resources.  Consider, for example, the market for 
a regular good, like wheat.  Instead of an intertemporal equilibrium price path, the 
market is presumed to clear independently in every period (for simplicity, I ignore 
inventories).  Figure 10 shows a succession of two such equilibria where both the price 
and quantity of wheat have increased during the given time interval.  Taken by itself, 
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that information does not allow one to infer whether supply has increased or decreased 
from one period to the next.  Only if the slope (or elasticity) of the supply curve is known 
can we distinguish the two possibilities.  What we can say, based on the principles of 
market equilibrium, is that if price and quantity of wheat have both moved in the same 
direction, then the demand for wheat must have shifted (and in the same direction).  We 
can also say that if price and quantity have moved in opposite directions, then supply of 
wheat must have shifted (in the same direction as quantity).  But in neither case can we 
say how large was the shift, nor can we tell whether the “other” curve has increased or 
decreased during the interval. 
As demonstrated in Smith (2009), knowledge of the elasticities of both supply 
and demand is required to say more.  In Figure 11, which shows a more complete 
picture of the market for wheat, equilibrium moves from (p1,q1) to (p2,q2) when demand 
and supply are perturbed.  The shift in demand, which is related to the combined effects 
of income, population growth, and other factors, is measured by the increase (holding 
price constant) from q1 to 2q , or in percentage terms by D = 2q /q1.  Although 2q  is not 
observable, its value can be deduced based on an estimate of the elasticity of demand, 
as follows.  The difference between 
2
q  and q2 represents a movement along the 
demand curve:  
2
q /q2 ≈   D21 p/p  .  This approximation is good for small price changes, 
and exact for all price changes if the elasticity of demand is constant.  Making this 
substitution allows us to identify the demand shift:  D =     D2112 p/pq/q  .  By similar 
means, the underlying shift in supply can be inferred from the presumed elasticity of 
supply:  S =     S2112 p/pq/q  .  Thus, the observed prices and quantities must be 
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supplemented by knowledge of the respective elasticities if we are to discern the impact 
of a shock to a particular factor. 
Even with a comprehensive set of historical market data (price and quantity) for 
the good in question it would be impossible to statistically estimate the elasticities in 
question without knowledge of movements in the concomitant variables (incomes, 
costs, etc.) that serve to identify each curve.  Analysts study market fundamentals for at 
least two reasons.  First, of course, is the fact that they wish to anticipate changes in 
prices before those changes are registered in the market.  Second is the fact that, even 
after such changes are recorded, it is impossible to disentangle the causes solely on the 
basis of the observed movements in price and quantity.  The punch line is that no 
simple indicator of increasing scarcity, or its causes, is available and examination of all 
the available indicators of industry conditions is needed. 
5.  Conclusion 
Although the concept of peak oil originated outside the field of economics, the 
peaking phenomenon can be viewed as an integral part of an intertemporal equilibrium 
that reflects the influence of supply and demand.  Placed in that context, where timing of 
the peak is endogenously determined by economic forces rather than nature, peaking is 
an event that potentially reveals meaningful information regarding the underlying market 
fundamentals.  As part of the ongoing search for useful economic indicators of resource 
scarcity, it seems reasonable therefore to investigate the properties of the peak and 
compare its usefulness to that of the more familiar alternatives.   
Unfortunately, as this paper demonstrates, peaking is an ambiguous indicator 
that provides inconsistent signals regarding resource scarcity.  Even if it were 
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announced that the peak will arrive earlier than expected, and you believed it, you 
would not know whether the news was good or bad.  However, we have also shown that 
the traditional indicators of resource scarcity (unit cost, resource rent, and price) fare no 
better.  They provide inconsistent signals of real changes in the underlying degree of 
resource scarcity, and they also incorporate the confounding influence of long-term 
trends unrelated to changes in scarcity. 
Thus, we cannot rely on any limited set of market indicators to gauge the status 
of our exhaustible resources.  This conclusion echoes the view of Cleveland and Stern 
(1999), who suggest that in order to develop more effective forecasts of future resource 
scarcity we need to look beyond the indicators to the production technologies, natural 
resource bases, and market structures that determine the indicators.  In other words, 
although the market fundamentals determine the indicators, the indicators do not reveal 
the fundamentals.  That knowledge comes only from detailed study of the primary 
economic factors that lie further below the surface.   
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Figure 1a:  Hubbert’s Worksheet (1956) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b:  Hubbert’s Curve—General Scheme 
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Figure 2:  Benchmark Scenario (elasticity = -0.35, growth = 1.5%) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  High Growth Scenario (elasticity = -0.35, growth = 2.75%) 
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Figure 4:  Low Growth Scenario (elasticity = -0.35, growth = 0.5%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Lifestyle Scenario (25% demand reduction) 
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Figure 6:  Resource Disappointment Scenario (elasticity = -0.35, growth = 1.5%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Technological Breakthrough Scenario (elasticity = -0.35, growth = 1.5%) 
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Figure 8:  Technological Progress Scenario (elasticity = -0.35, growth = 1.5%) 
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Figure 9:  Comparative Statics vs. Equilibrium Dynamics of Scarcity 
 
 
Panel A:  Impact of Unexpected Reserve Loss 
 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Impact of Equilibrium Depletion 
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Figure 10:  What Do Market Indicators Reveal? 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Decomposing the Change in Fundamentals 
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Table 1:  Summary of Equilibrium Depletion Paths, by Economic Scenario 
 
 
 
Economic Scenario P0 PT T tpeak tpeak/T Qpeak/URR rmonthly rannual 
Benchmark $26.61 $100.00 315 113 36% 36% 1.20% 15.39%
High Growth $28.50 $100.00 284 284 100% 100% 1.24% 15.98%
Low Growth $25.10 $100.00 348 0 0% 0% 1.15% 14.73%
Resource Disappointment $30.64 $100.00 255 53 21% 21% 1.29% 16.60%
Cost Breakthrough $22.42 $100.00 308 62 20% 21% 1.46% 18.98%
Continuous Innovation $27.72 $100.00 311 123 40% 40% 1.17% 14.93%
Life Style Change $23.76 $100.00 386 184 48% 48% 1.10% 13.98%
Legend: P0 =    Price at initial time.
PT =  Price at time when resource is fully depleted.
T =  Elapsed time before depletion occurs (in months).
tpeak =  Elapsed time before peak production occurs (in months).
tpeak/T =  Relative timing of peak production.
Qpeak/URR =  Cumulative depletion before peak production occurs.
rmonthly =  Average monthly price change.
rannual =  Average annual price change.
